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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the Stockholm conference in 1972, the international community is seeking ways
to better integrate development patterns and environmental issues. This is a huge
challenge and an uneasy task given the complexity of underlying issues and geopolit-
ical interests. The concept of sustainable development elaborated in the aftermath
of the Brundtland report (United Nations World Commission on Environment and
Development, 1987) has been used as an inclusive narrative to take up the challenge.
The European Union for instance has mainstreamed sustainable development in a
broad range of its policies. Although regularly criticized for being too vague and not
providing concrete solutions enough, this concept remains at the core of the agenda
of international negotiations, in particular in the current process of Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs) 1. In parallel, the acceleration of the globalization process
over the last twenty years has been accompagnied by a redefinition of geopolitical
balances. Most of economic sectors are impacted and new sources of tensions have
emerged particularly on natural resources. A comprehensive approach that is able
to encompass these multi-dimensional issues is then necessary to build sustainable
development pathways.
The Globis project started by clarifying both concepts of sustainable develop-
ment and globalization in WP1 and 2. The four case studies (energy/transport/landuse-
food/ecoinnovation) elaborated in WP3 have shed lights on some key sustainability
issues regarding the interactions between globalization and sustainable development,
with a specific focus on long term trends. (Waisman et al., 2014) shows the sensi-
tivity of long-term growth patterns at the global level and in an oil-importing and
highly carbon emitting region like Europe 2 to the features of long-term oil markets
and to the implementation of climate policies. According to (Brunelle et al., 2014a),
the production system may catch up with its biophysical asymptotes (in terms of
1At the Rio+20 Conference in 2012 member States agreed to launch a process to develop a
set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in view of the 2015 development agenda, see more
information on http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300
2Indeed, given that imports supply 40% of European primary energy, corresponding to 2.8% of
the EU GDP (Growth Domestic Product), energy security is a policy priority for the EU and its
member states as put forward in recent official texts (see, e.g., the 2013 G&P)
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availability of high quality lands) in case of subsequent shifts in food diets converging
towards Western lifestyles while (Ko¨hler et al., 2014) focuses on the conditions of
the development of a second generation of biofuels in developing countries. (Ko¨hler,
2014) envisages at least several pathways for green logistics and sustainable supply
chain management to move toward sustainable transport (international shipping and
long-haul aviation).
The final objective of the project is to provide an integrated vision of these four
case studies in WP4. This deliverable will specifically analyze the conflicts and
synergies between various sustainability issues that stem from these four cross sec-
tors linkages under different visions of globalization and development pathways. The
challenge is thus to integrate sector-based analysis in a common economic framework
capturing the interplay between innovation, the evolution of life styles, macroeco-
nomic constraints (investments, trade...) in a world experiencing strong economic
transitions.This report will then develop a set of comprehensive scenarios at the
World and European levels. These numerical experiments will aim at analyzing i)
the mechanisms that explain the tensions and synergies between various sustainabil-
ity issues (climate change, land availability, energy security) under various views of
the future of economic globalization and ii) ways to mitigate these tensions within
the framework of each scenario. We will specifically assess the implementation of cli-
mate policies. CO2 emissions have indeed continued to grow in the past decade even
more rapidly than predicted (Peters et al., 2011; Raupach et al., 2007; IPCC, 2014).
This context is the result of both the difficulty to decouple growth and carbon emis-
sions in developed regions, where development styles cannot be changed overnight,
and the rapid carbon-intensive growth patterns of emerging countries (IEA, 2012).
It also highlights the necessity to implement ambitious measures to trigger a strong
bifurcation away from carbon-intensive development paths (IPCC, 2007, 2014)3. De-
spite this scientific consensus, the implementation of ambitious global carbon emis-
sion reduction targets remains highly uncertain as shown by the difficulties to reach
a global climate agreement under the United Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), in particular since the failure of the Copenhagen Conference
in 2009. This is essentially due to the concerns about (a) significant welfare and
economic losses consecutive to carbon restrictions and (b) the interplay of climate
measures with other sensitive political issues such as the financial crisis, poverty al-
leviation, job creation, energy and food security, or health and local environmental
protection (e.g., see the dilemma of the climate development Gordian knot discussed
in (Hourcade et al., 2008)). An integrated vision between sustainable development
and the globalization process can be a precondition to overcome this dilemma in
view of post 2015 climate policies.
To do that, we use the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model IMACLIM-
R, which provides an innovative framework to organize the dialogue between eco-
3At stabilization levels around 400 ppm CO2eq or below, global mean temperatures are likely
to stay below 2°C, and there is a 50% probability of exceeding a 2°C temperature increase at levels
of around 450 ppm CO2eq (IPCC, 2007, 2013)
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nomics (to capture the general interdependences between sectors, issues and policy
decisions), and engineering sciences (to capture the technical constraints and margins
of freedom). It provides a multisectoral, dynamic modeling approach for thinking the
link between growth, globalization, and energy constraints given the limited avail-
ability of fossil resources and carbon mitigation policies. This framework captures
four crucial determinants of the interplay between the energy sector, sustainability
objectives, and globalization processes: (a) non marginal deviations with respect
to current socioeconomic trends produce room for deep technical change over the
course of the century 4 ; (b) beyond technological improvements, the integration
of lifestyles, consumption patterns, and preferences in driving the material content
of economic activity is captured (Mitchell, 2012); (c) limitations in the flexibility
of technicoeconomic adjustments during transition processes affect the adaptability
of the economy to sustainability constraints because of market imperfections, tech-
nical inertias, and imperfect expectations; and (d) the competitiveness of opened
economies on international markets impacts the balance of goods and capital. The
IMACLIM modeling platform has been complemented by linking a specific module
(the Nexus Land-Use model) to assess the feedbacks between land use dynamics and
the rest of the economy.
Chapter 2 presents the set of storylines of the integrated scenarios and Chapter 3
the rationale of the modeling approach. Chapter 4 quantifies the long term effect
on the scenarios and highlights the main elements of discussions.
4Technical change is a change in the amount of output produced from the same inputs. Such a
change is not necessarily technological but might include organizational transformations or be the
result of a change in a constraint such as regulation, prices, or quantities of inputs.
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Chapter 2
Definition of storylines
The first step of our methodology consists in building storylines which include the
main features of the case studies. The challenge is to embark in a comprehensive
manner detailed qualitative information in a quantitative/numerical model. To that
end, we need to adapt the modeling platform but also include part of the qualitative
information to inform relevant parameters. In this study, we build storylines around
two main dimensions to integrate the four main issues of the project and we then
assess the impact of a climate policy (see Fig. 2.2).
The first dimension encompasses different features regarding development styles:
energy consumption behaviors (that are directly linked to housing and people’s
way/habit of consumption of goods) and the food diets (which directly impact agri-
cultural practices and land use management). The second dimension captures the
financial and trade aspects of the globalization process. Well-informed readers will
see some similarities with the SRES scenarios (IPCC, 2000) that assessed the main
drivers of emissions, in particular the pursuit of the globalization process (although
the SRES report considers only scenarios without climate policies) 1. This work has
not the ambitious to provide a new SRES exercise but tries to better understand the
impact of some mechanisms of the globalization process related to trade and finance
that were poorly considered in the SRES exercices.
For each dimension, we consider two extreme assumptions:
• Low intensive vs high intensive use of energy, transport and calory/meat in-
tensive diets.
• Globalized vs regionalized trade (trade is gradually re-directed to regional
markets) and capital markets.
By combining the two dimensions, we define four main scenarios representing
four visions of development pathways:
1Special Report on Emissions Scenarios. Published in 2000, the SRES scenarios cover a wide
range of the main driving forces of future emissions, from demographic to technological and economic
developments. Each scenario corresponds to one out four main storylines and was produced by
modeling IIASA team (IPCC, 2000)
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Figure 2.1: Scenarios dimensions
• Scenario G1 (Glob HighCons) can be viewed as a benchmark case in the sense
that it assumes a pursuit of current trends in energy consumption, food diets
and international trade of goods and capital.
• Scenario G2 (Glob LowCons) describes a world wherein the globalization of
trade and capitals continues but with a shift in terms of development path-
ways, low energy consumption and a convergence toward sustainable feeding
conditions (see section 3.2.1 for a detailed presentation of theses assumptions)
• Scenario G3 (Frag HighCons) assumes a pursuit of current trends in energy
consumption in a “fragmented” world. In this “fragmented” world, measures
are undertaken to regulate the capital flows at the international scale in order
to limit the risks of new financial crunch similar to 2008. Trade flows are also
regulated at the international and regional level to protect local production
in developing countries for harsh competition through feed in tariffs and also
industrial productions in developed countries such as Europe.
• In Scenario G4 (Frag LowCons), the same shift in development pathways as
observed in G2 senario occurs in a ”fragmented” world.
We then assess the impact of a climate policy. For the comparability of results,
this article considers a unique climate objective. It consists of limiting the tem-
perature increase with respect to preindustrial levels to +2.5°C, which is commonly
believed to be more realistic than the +2°C 2.
2The adoption of an ambitious global agreement on climate reduction emissions by 2015 and
strong assumptions on technical change are indeed necessary to comply with the 2°C objective,
which leaves little flexibility in terms of action (Edenhofer et al., 2010; Guivarch et al., 2011)
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Figure 2.2: The four Scenarios
Following (Barker et al., 2007), this objective is translated into a carbon emission
profile characterized by a peak of world CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2030 and
a stabilization in 2050 with respect to 2000 levels (Fig. 3.3).
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Chapter 3
Methodology
The objective of this study is to integrate the energy, transport and land-use sectors
in the same analytical framework. To cover these three sectors, we use two types of
modelling tools: the IMACLIM-R model for the energy and transport sectors, and
the Nexus Land-Use model for the land-use sector. This section describes the func-
tioning of both models, as well as the methodology used for establishing a dialogue
between these numerical tools.
3.1 IMACLIM-R
The risk of non-sustainable development stems ultimately from the joint effect of
issues as diverse as climate change, energy and food security, land cover changes
and social dualism in urban and rural areas. These issues in turn depend on the
dynamics of consumption and technologies in sectors such as energy, transportation,
construction and food production and on the hazards caused by shortages of pri-
mary resources or by the transformation of our global environment. The challenge is
thus to integrate sector-based analysis in a common economic framework capturing
their interplay in a world experiencing very rapid demographic and economic transi-
tions. The IMACLIM model was built in an attempt to address three methodological
challenges through an integrated modelling approach (Weyant et al., 1996) to incor-
porate knowledge from economics and engineering sciences, to support the dialogue
with and between stakeholders and to produce scenarios with a strong consistency,
concerning especially the interplay between development patterns, technology and
growth. It adopts a dynamic, multiregion, and multisector representation of the
world economy on the backbone 1 of a CGE framework (see (Waisman et al., 2012a)
for a detailed description). It provides a consistent vision of economic and energy
1The version of the IMACLIM-R model used in this study divides the world in 12 regions (the
United States, Canada, Europe, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]
Pacific, former Soviet Union, China, India, Brazil, Middle East, Africa, rest of Asia, and rest of Latin
America) and 12 sectors (coal, oil, gas, liquid fuels, electricity, air transport, water transport, other
transport, construction, agriculture, energy-intensive industry, and services and light industry)
9
trajectories in yearly steps from 2010 to 2100 through the recursive succession of
a top-down annual static equilibrium providing a snapshot of the economy at each
yearly time step and through bottom-up dynamic modules informing the evolution
of technical parameters between two equilibria (Fig. 3.1). The IMACLIM model is
built as a platform which can include different modules depending on the issues tack-
led. In this report, the IMACLIM model will be linked to the nexus land use which
represents the agricultural and land use dynamics (see section 3.2 for a detailed
description of the model).
Figure 3.1: Scenarios dimensions
The static equilibrium represents short-run macroeconomic interactions at each
date t under technology and capacity constraints. It is calculated assuming Leontief
production functions with fixed unitary intermediate consumption, labor inputs,
and mark-up in non-energy sectors. Households maximize their utility through a
trade-off between consumption goods, mobility services, and residential energy uses
considering fixed end-use equipment. The equilibrium is given by market clearing
conditions on all markets (including energy), which provides a snapshot of the econ-
omy at date t in terms of relative prices, wages, employment, production levels, and
trade flows.
The dynamic modules are reduced forms of bottom-up models, which describe
the evolution of structural and technical parameters between t and t+1 in response
to past and current economic signals. Each year, the regional capital accumulation is
given by firms investment, households savings (controlled by exogenous saving rates
like in (Solow, 1956), and international capital flows. On that basis, the distribution
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of investments across sectors is governed by expectations on sector profitability and
technical conditions as described in sector-specific reduced forms of technology-rich
models (see details in (Bibas et al., 2014) or in the supplementary material of (Wais-
man et al., 2012a)). These modules represent the evolution of technical coefficients
resulting from agents’ microeconomic decisions on technological choices, given the
limits imposed by the innovation possibility frontier (Ahmad, 1966). The new in-
vestment choices and technical coefficients are then sent back to the static module in
the form of updated production capacities and input output coefficients to calculate
the equilibrium at t+1.
This modeling framework differs from conventional Integrated Assessment Mod-
els (IAMs) by several features that make it relevant to study important specificities
of sustainability transitions. First, the consistency of the iteration between the
static equilibrium and dynamic modules relies on hybrid matrices, which ensure an
explicit representation of the material and technical content of production processes
through a description of the economy in consistent money values and physical quan-
tities (Sands et al., 2005). Second, the equilibrium does not necessarily correspond
to economic optimality because inertias on capital stocks limit the pace of technical
change, the stickiness of the labor market affects labor adjustments, and market
power leads to departures from marginal cost pricing. This means that production
factors (production capacity and labor force) are not fully used, which ensures the
possibility to represent idle capacities and unemployment. Third, contrary to the
conventional assumption of intertemporally optimizing models, agents have imper-
fect knowledge about the future and may make investment decisions according to
biased expectations. This allows representing bifurcations, lockins, and potential
cobenefits in the course of sustainable trajectories. Fourth, the hybrid structure
of the model allows making explicit the technical assumptions behind the trajecto-
ries, which can be informed by sector-based information and expert views about,
for example, asymptotes on ultimate technical potentials, learning-by-doing mech-
anisms, saturation in efficiency progress, the impact of incentive systems, and the
role of market or institutional imperfections. Given the uncertainty on the long-
term dynamics of these dimensions, their explicit representation allows considering
variants of scenarios suited to capture alternative views on these controversial pa-
rameters. Finally, contrary to the common approach of a unique composite good,
the detailed multisectoral structure distinguishes productive sectors (agriculture,
heavy industries, manufacturing, and services) according to their economic char-
acteristics and their exposure to international trade. This allows a more precise
description of the determinants of international trade. The next sections detail the
modeling options adopted for the three core dimensions of the present study, de-
velopment styles/consumption pathways, climate policy (Climate Constraints and
Carbon Price), and international trade (Specifications for International Trade).
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3.1.1 Modeling the Long-Term Dynamics of Oil Markets
Market mechanisms in the oil sector are driven by the utilization rate of production
capacities, given by the ratio of total demand to production capacities: the higher the
utilization rate, the higher the scarcity rent and the profit margin for oil producers
(Robert K. Kaufmann and Sanchez, 2004). We model the oil price formation through
an explicit description of its geopolitical, technical, and economic determinants on
both supply and demand. We represent (a) the heterogeneity of oil reserves as a
function of their cost of production and conventional versus nonconventional nature;
(b) the limitations on the short-term adaptability of oil supply due to the geological
nature of reserves; (c) the market power of Middle East producers until the depletion
affects the deployment of their production capacities; (d) technical change affecting
the demand for liquid fuels in industry, residential, transport, and power sectors; and
(e) the potentials and obstacles to the diffusion of biofuels and coal-to-liquid fuels
as oil substitutes. These features of the representation of oil supply and demand
dynamics are more extensively described in (Waisman et al., 2012b). In this report,
we adopt median assumptions on the crucial determinants of oil price dynamics,
namely the amount of reserves, geological inertias (assumed to be the same for
conventional and nonconventional reserves), and the short-term price targeted by
Middle East producers (assumed to be stabilized around its 2010 level).
3.1.2 Modeling development patterns
One of the scenario dimension concentrates on a few main drivers of development
patterns, which are understood as constraints on behaviours and households’ pref-
erences that impact energy consumption.
3.1.2.1 Private buildings
We introduce assumptions on the evolution of households’ preferences in housing.
The ’Housing and Buildings’ module of Imaclim-R represents the dynamics of energy
consumption as a function of the energy service level per housing square meter
(heating, cooling, etc.) and the total housing surface. The former is represented by
coefficients encompassing the technical characteristics of the existing stock of end-use
equipment and buildings and the increase in demand for energy services: heating,
cooking, hot water, lighting, air conditioning, refrigeration and freezing and electrical
appliances. Housing surface per capita is driven by an income elasticity that drives
the pace of convergence towards region-specific asymptotes of the floor area per
capita.This limit reflects spatial constraints, cultural habits as well as assumptions
about future development styles (including the lifestyles in emerging countries vis-a`-
vis the US, European or Japanese way of life). For low consumption pathways (say
G2 Glob LowCons and G4 Frag LowCons), a lower limit of the floor area per capita
is taken for developing countries, as well as a lower income elasticity of building
stock growth (including Former Soviet Union and Japan for constrasting scenarios).
Finally, all scenarios include a household’s fuel price threshold that represents an
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exit of fuel in private buildings heating. High Consumption pathways scenarios
(G1 Glob HighCons and G3 Frag LowCons) stop using fuel in buldings from 1300$
within 20 years, while lower energy intensive scenarios (G2 Glob LowCons and G4
Frag LowCons) stop using fuel in buldings from 1000$ within 10 years.
3.1.2.2 Industrial goods consumption
Households’ industrial goods consumption are caped to consider a switch from in-
dustrial goods to services as households gradually reach satiety in industrial goods
equipment. The industrial and services sectors are each represented in an aggregated
manner in the model, covering a large variety of economic sub-sectors and products.
Technical change then encompasses not only changes and technical progress in each
sub-sector but also the structural effects across sectors. In addition to autonomous
energy efficiency gains, the Imaclim-R model represents the structural drop in energy
intensity related to a progressive transition from energy-intensive heavy industries
to manufacturing industries, and the choice of new techniques which results in both
energy efficiency gains and changes in the energy mix. The progressive switch from
industry to services is controlled by saturation levels of per capita consumption of
industrial goods (in physical terms, not necessarily in value terms) via an asymp-
tote calibrated as a possible multiplier of 2001 levels. For developing countries,
these saturation levels represent various types of catch-up to the consumption style
in developed countries. Saturation levels are supposed lower in low energy intensive
scenarios (G2 Glob LowCons and G4 Frag LowCons).
3.1.2.3 Freight content of industrial production
In the freight sector, total energy demand is then driven by freight mobility needs,
in turn depending on the level of economic activities and their freight content. Even
though the share of transportation in total costs is currently low, decoupling freight
mobility demand and economic growth is an important determinant of long-term
mitigation costs. In the absence of such a decoupling (constant input-output coeffi-
cient), and once efficiency potentials in freight transportation have been exhausted,
constraining sectoral carbon emissions from freight transportation would amount
to constraining economic activity. We thus build alternative evolutions of freight
content of industrial good production (which includes both transport to the con-
sumer as well as transport needs for inputs for the industrial production) through
the transportation requirement per unit good produced. The later is slowly reduced
in all regions for the constrained behavior scenarios (say G2 Glob LowCons and G4
Frag LowCons), hypothesis that are kept only for China and India otherwise (G1
Glob HighCons and G3 Frag HighCons).
3.1.3 Specifications for international trade of capital and goods
The endogenization of capital flows has hardly been integrated in global-scale energy-
economy models because of a lack of shared empirical evidence and unresolved con-
13
troversies in the economic literature.2.
Following this diagnosis we adopt exogenous assumptions on the dynamics of
capital flows, defined by the net balance between capital exports and imports, in-
cluding the return to foreign direct investments. Base year imbalances on capital
flows are explicitly represented through the calibration of capital imports/exports
at the initial date. Their dynamics are ruled by two alternative assumptions:
• A constant over-time share of exported capital to model the persistence of
current international capital imbalances
• An exponential decrease of all capital flows to represent a progressive decrease
of international capital imbalances by 2050. This assumption corresponds to
a vision of fragmented capital markets which imposes the financing of local
investments by local capital.
All intermediate and final goods can be traded internationally, and total demand
for each type of goods is met by a mix of domestic production and imports. Domestic
and international markets for all goods are cleared (i.e. no stock is allowed) by
a unique set of endogenous relative prices (the terms of trade), which adjust to
maintain the equilibrium of the balance of payments defined by the sum of trade
flows and capital flows. Trade flows are represented in physical quantities for energy
flows (MToe), whereas all other goods are described with Armington specifications
to capture imperfect substitutability among goods produced in different regions. We
consider two parametric options to capture alternative visions of trade globalization:
• A high value of Armington elasticities representing high substitutability be-
tween goods produced in different places. This assumption favors current
trends of international trade with intense competition and large import/export
flows in all world regions.
• A low value of Armington elasticities representing low substitutability between
goods produced in different places and a preference for local goods. This
assumption comes down to envisage a slowing down of international trade and
a re-regionalization of production close to demand.
3.2 Modelling the agricultural intensification and the
land constraint: The NLU model
3.2.1 General description of the NLU model
The Nexus Land-Use model (NLU) simulates changes in the agricultural sector at
the global level under various assumptions regarding biomass demand (Souty et al.,
2012). The model relies on resource-use balance of crop and livestock products
expressed in kilocalories (kcal), the common unit used for nutrition (1 kcal=4.1868
2A notable exception is (McKibbin et al., 1999)
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kJ). At the model base year (2001), the resource-use balance is established on the
basis of data from the global database Agribiom (Dorin, 2011). Using calories makes
it possible to deal with different types of biomass for human consumption. In NLU,
plant food, ruminant and monogastric calories are thus separated, and each type of
calorie is associated with a specific production process.
Based on the livestock model provided by (Bouwman et al., 2005), monogastric
animals are fed by a mix of food crops, residues and fodder. The production of
ruminants is either intensive or extensive. In the intensive system, ruminants are
fed by a mix of food crops, residues, fodder and grass, while they are exclusively
fed with grass in the extensive system. In the NLU model, the frontier between the
intensive and extensive systems evolve according to relative profits in each system.
Crop- and pastureland for producing food crops and grass are endogenously modeled
in NLU. On the other hand, the evolution of fodder area is mainly exogenously set
(see infra).
The production of plant food calories (for food and feed use) is represented using
a representative crop, as follows: at the base year, a representative potential yield
is computed on a 0.5°×0.5° grid from the potential yields given by the vegetation
model LPJmL for 11 crop functional types (CFT). Land classes grouping together
grid points with the same potential crop yield are set up. Actual crop yield in
each land class is determined by a non-linear function of chemical inputs, such as
fertilisers and pesticides. In each land class, consumption of chemical inputs and
associated crop yields are determined by cost minimisation. In this ways, NLU
makes it possible to represent the land-fertiliser substitution by taking into account
the land heterogeneity.
Two categories of crops are distinguished in NLU: “dynamic” crops, correspond-
ing to most cereals, oilseeds, sugar beet and cassava, with a small share of fodder
crops and “other” crops including sugar cane, palm oil, vegetables and fruits, some
fodder crops and remaining crops. “Dynamic” crop yield is endogenously deter-
mined, taking into account biophysical constraints and the amount of fertiliser used.
The share of “other” crops in total crop production is supposed to be constant over
the projection period 2005-2050. The “other” crop yield is an exogenous parameter
calculated based on the projections from (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012).
In 2001 (model base year), the model is based on the land-use map from (Ra-
mankutty et al., 2008). The total cropland area amounts to 1472 Mha, divided
between 748 Mha of “dynamic” crops and 724 Mha of “other” crops. Production on
“dynamic” cropland represents ∼80% of the global calorie production reported by
the global database Agribiom.
In NLU, three categories of pastures are distinguished. The two first are inten-
sive and extensive pastures, corresponding to the two livestock production systems
represented in NLU. A third category, called “residual”‘, is considered. This latter
use of land is assumed to be inefficient in the sense that production cost is not min-
imised. The residual pastures may correspond in reality to lands extensively man-
aged because of geographic and institutional limitations (e.g. high transport cost,
inadequate topography or specific land property rights). Residual pastures have the
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same yield as extensive pastures. In the model base year, the total pasture area
amounts to 2694 Mha following (Ramankutty et al., 2008). The quantification of
total permanent pasture area is however highly uncertain due to the unclear distinc-
tion between rangeland and grassland pastures in national inventories (Ramankutty
et al., 2008). In this study, we choose the Ramankutty et al. (2008) dataset, which
is believed to be more reliable than the FAO statistics, as the authors use a specific
method relying both on satellite data and national inventories.
Two types of biomass for energy are represented in NLU: (i) first generation
biofuel and (ii) short-rotation woody crops for bioelectricity (willow or poplar).
Bioenergy production is modelled as a production constraint. Production of first
generation biofuel is shared between biodiesel and ethanol based on the 2008 pro-
duction (OECD and FAO, 2008). The share of the different crops in 1st gen biofuel
production is based on the 2006 production (Balat and Balat, 2009; Brasil, Ministe´rio
da Agricultura, Pecua´ria e Abastecimento, 2013). China and India are supposed to
use only jatropha for biodiesel, not in competition with croplands. Biodiesel in Eu-
ropean Union is produced from sunflower (5% ) and rapeseed (95%). Biodiesel in
Africa and Rest of Asia is produced exclusively from palm oil.
The yield of feedstock for biofuel is set on the representative crop yield for the
plant included in the “dynamic crop” (corn, wheat, sorghum, soybean, rapdeseed,
sunflower). Palm oil plus kernel oil yield and palmkernel cake yield are taken from
the last ten years. Sugarcane yield is taken from last ten years too. Cotton and
Jatropha are supposed to represent a constant share of the other crop area.
By-products energy per ton of crop is computed by considering that the total
energy per unit of mass in crop is available for byproducts, after oil, as well as
transesterification (biodiesel) or fermentation (ethanol) losses are removed. The by-
products energy content is substracted from the total calorie demand as long as it
does not exceed the regional feed demand.
Yields of short-rotation woody crops is set on the gross annual increment (gai)
provided by (Smeets et al., 2007, 39GJ/ha/year or 9.3Gcal/ha/year). The global
gai value is scaled over the NLU regions according to the mean potential yield of our
representative crop, assuming it is a reliable index of the land fertility. To account
for the technological changes that may affect the woody biomass sector (in terms
of harvest and species selection), we assume that the gai converge towards the net
primary productivity reported by (Smeets et al., 2007, ∼120 GJ/ha or ∼30Gcal/ha)
The performances of the model have been investigated through a backcasting
exercise over the period 1961-2006. Estimations of cropland areas (sum of areas for
“dynamic” and “other” crops) in each region are evaluated against historical data in
each region from (Ramankutty and Foley, 1999). At the global scale, the simulated
cropland area fit observations rather well. The root-mean-square errors (RMSE)
amounts to 52.3 Mha p.y. in absolute terms and 3.6% p.y. in relative ones.
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3.2.2 Modeling development styles in NLU
The development styles/consumption pathways can be studied with NLU by test-
ing two contrasting food demand scenario. The first one is the scenario produced
in the 2012 revision of the foresight exercise from the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization if the United Nations (FAO) “World Agriculture Towards 2030/2050”
(Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). This scenario can be viewed as a business as
usual pathway. According to their narrative, changes in diet will be a significant
driver of the growth in the demand for agricultural products. However, convergence
of diets towards developed countries should not completely level out consumption
styles across developed and developing countries. In particular, substantial differ-
ences may remain in the consumption of meat and milk. Regional food habits, such
as taboos on cattle meat in India or pig meat in Muslim countries, will slow the
“livestock revolution” experienced by countries like China, Brazil or Malaysia.
In contrast to this business as usual vision, we consider an alternative scenario
based on a convergence towards sustainable feeding conditions, through (i) the re-
duction in malnutrition and in the excesses in nutritional intake, (ii) the reduction in
the share of animal calories in diets, and (iii) the reduction of food waste throughout
the consumption process. This scenario is taken from the “Agrimonde 1” scenario
of the French foresight exercise “Agrimonde” (Paillard et al., 2011b,a).
3.2.3 Specifications for international trade of agricultural goods
The international trade is modelled by using a pool representation without any
consideration of the geographic origin of goods. Imports and exports are determined
by relative regional calorie prices, taking into account a simple representation of
imperfect competition and food sovereignty considerations. Coefficients governing
the trade volume are calibrated against the year 2001 using Agribiom data. The
(regional) price-elasticities of exports are calibrated against the 1961-2006 period.
For this exercise, the fragmentation of goods market are represented by reducing
the value of the price-elasticity of trade reflecting the imperfect competition on the
international markets of agricultural goods.
3.3 The coupling methodology IMACLIM-NLU
The objective of the coupling is to incorporate into the IMACLIM-R framework a
representation of the land constraint which is consistent with biophysical potentials
and farmer’s optimization behavior3. The coupling between IMACLIM and NLU
is made in two steps. First, we implement a one-directional soft linking, in which
IMACLIM feeds NLU with energy prices and a demand for bioenergy. Then, the
hard coupling between the two models is implemented in a second step. We detail
3For a detailed description on bioenergy supply in IMACLIM-R, and its implications on CO2
emissions pathways, see (Bibas and Me´jean, 2013)
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in this report the whole coupling methodology, but the results will focus only on the
first step.
3.3.1 One-directional soft linking
The energy prices (oil and gas price) computed by IMALCIM-R drives the fertiliser
price used in NLU, and thus the level of intensification. At each timestep t, fertiliser
price in NLU is computed at the world level based on an econometric relation with
oil and gas price as follows:
log(PNLUf,t ) = α+ β · log(PObsf,t−1) + γ · log(PEner,t−1) + δ · log(PEner,t) (3.1)
With PEner=SN · Pgas + (SP + SK) · Poil
SN , SP and SK correspond respectively to the share of N, P and K in the total
NPK consumption. The index PEner, defined as the weighted sum of Pgas and
Poil, is used to circumvent the colinearity issues between oil and gas prices. P
Obs
f,t−1
refers to the observed fertilizer price values, and α, β, γ and δ denote the estimated
parameters. More details are provided in (Brunelle et al., 2014b). The projection of
the fertiliser price to 2100 is made based on the gas and oil price (secondary energy)
coming from IMACLIM-R.
In this soft linking, IMACLIM computes the quantities of bioenergy (biofuel
+ woody biomass energy) that are necessary to reach a given emissions target,
and send these quantites to NLU, which calculates the intensification level (mainly
crop yield, share of extensive ruminant production and calorie price, as well as the
corresponding CO2 and non CO2 emissions) to meet the demand for bioenergy.
3.3.2 Hard coupling
The basic functioning of the hard coupling between IMACLIM and NLU is described
on Fig.3.2. To carry out this coupling, NLU has been modified to be driven by an
exogenous price trend, rather than by a demand trend. The calorie price that
equalizes the profitability of biofuel against the oil price (augmented by a carbon
tax in the mitigation scenario) from IMACLIM-R is computed. NLU calculates the
biofuel production which is economically profitable given this calorie price, and the
other types of biomass that should be addressed.
The modelling of biomass for electricity relies on an different scheme. In this case,
IMACLIM-R computes the quantities of biomass electricity that are economically
profitable compared to other production options given the emissions target. These
quantities are homogenously shared on the distribution of land used in the NLU
model using the GAI as a proxy of the woody biomass yield (see section 3.2).
To update the input-output coefficients in IMACLIM-R with the values com-
puted in NLU, we need to disaggregate the agricultural sector of IMACLIM-R as it
includes both the feedstock production sector (=agriculture, denoted “agri”) and the
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Figure 3.2: IMACLIM-R – NLU coupling Scheme
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food processing industry (=agroalimentary, not modelled in NLU, denoted “agro”).
To do so, we use the GTAP database to split at the base year the hybrid matrix
of the agricultural sector of IMACLIM into two subsectors, agri and agro. The
agri sector is condsidered to be entirely determined by NLU, while the agro sector
acts as a residue between the whole agricultural sector of IMACLIM-R and the agri
sector. Thus, the coefficients of the agri sector are updated according to the evo-
lutions computed in NLU, while the coefficients of the agro sector are deduced by
substracting the updated coefficients of the agri sector from the coefficients of the
whole agricultural sector computed by IMACLIM-R. Then the production and the
profit margin of the agroalimentary subsector are deduced by considering a fixed
share of labor and profit in the added value. In the same logic, the markup of the
agricultural sector of IMACLIM-R evolves according to the land rent trajectories
calculated by NLU.
A last step of the coupling consists in updating the intermediary coefficient of
gas consumption in the industrial sector of IMACLIM-R to correctly account for
the gas-intensive production process of fertilizers. To do so, we use the quantity of
fertilizers used in agriculture provided by NLU, and we distinguish in the industrial
sector of IMACLIM-R a subsector corresponding to the fertilizers production sector.
The input-output coefficient of the two new sub-sectors (fertilizers production and
other industrial sectors) are calibrated using the GTAP database.
3.3.3 Climate constraints and carbon price
Carbon emissions arising from the production and use of coal, oil, and gas are
accounted for via coefficients capturing their respective carbon content.4. When
climate policies are implemented, a constraint on the profile of carbon emissions is
imposed as a function of the chosen climate stabilization target (Fig. 3.3). This
constraint on carbon emissions is satisfied thanks to the introduction of a market-
based instrument in the form of a carbon price, which is considered by economists
as the most efficient way to tackle the diversity of emissions of greenhouses gases
and abatement sources in the economy (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). The carbon price
increases the cost of final goods and intermediate consumption as a function of
the carbon content of the energy used, and favors the adoption of carbon mitiga-
tion options in carbon-intensive sectors (industry, residential, power generation, and
transport). After 2010, the carbon price value is endogenously calculated to abarte
carbon emissions according to the prescribed objective, and associated revenues are
collected (by the government) which are then reallocated to households or firms
through transfers. A uniform climate policy in all regions and sectors and relying
on a world-level carbon price instrument is obviously a simplification of what can be
reasonably expected in the future, and is chosen for the sake of simplicity. It poses
in particular a number of questions that are far beyond the scope of this report
but are worth noting here: (a) monetary transfers to gain compliance of emerging
4Those coefficients only account for actual emissions, and exclude carbon captured either bio-
logically (biofuels) or technologically (carbon capture and sequestration)
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countries;10 (b) tax exemptions to protect certain specific activities (on the pattern
of the EU-ETS for industrial activities); and (c) the role of accompanying measures
to climate policies such as fiscal reforms, specific labor market policies (Guivarch
et al., 2011), or complementary infrastructure policies (Waisman et al., 2013).
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Figure 3.3: Carbon emission profile under climate policy
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Chapter 4
Results
4.1 IMACLIM-R standalone
4.1.1 Long-Term Oil Profiles and Macroeconomic Trajectories
In this section, we first consider the case where climate policy is not implemented,
i.e. no constraint on carbon emissions is imposed. We study the dynamics of oil mar-
kets and their macroeconomic effects on the transition toward low-oil development
patterns as imposed by constraints on oil availability.
4.1.1.1 Dynamics of Oil Markets
In all scenarios, the world oil production follows an inverted U-shape reaching a max-
imum around 2035-2040 (the so-called Peak Oil) before a continuous decrease over
the long term, as shown in Figure 4.2 for the bechmark scenario (Glob HighCons).
Oil prices trajectories are characterized by three disctinct phases in the Benchmark
scenario (Fig. 4.1). Oil prices follow a slightly increasing plateau around 100 USD
per barrel followed by a continuous increase at the date of Peak Oil (2040) to more
than 500 USD per barrel in the long-term.
To analyze the effects of different asumptions regarding globalization and con-
sumption pathways, we compare oil price trajectories in the G2, G3 and G4 scenarios
with the trend in the G1 scenario (Glob HighEner) (Fig. 4.3).
4.1.1.2 Globalization effect
In the short (between 2010 and 2040) and medium term (after 2040, i.e. during the
Peak Oil period), oil prices are lower in globalized scenarios (G1 Glob HighEner and
G2 Glob LowEner in Fig. 4.3). This illustrates a moderation of the demand for oil.
This is the result of higher capital availability that fosters technical change in
a globalized context. Waisman et al. (2014) indeed show that less capital fluidity
in a context of fragmented globalization slows down the pace of technical change
towards more efficient technologies and triggers a higher dependence on oil. This in
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Figure 4.1: World oil price in $2001 / (Million b/d)
turn explains an increase of energy intensity of GDP after the peak oil (Fig. 4.4).
In the long term, after 2080, however, energy intensity in G3 and 4 (Frag HighCons
and Frag LowCons) tends to catch up with energy intensity in G1 (Glob HighCons)
and G2 (Glob LowCons scenarios) scenarios. At that time, the economy is less
dependent on international transport in the G3 and G4 scenarios, as shown by the
lower energy content of transport, in particular for Europe in Figure 4.5.
4.1.1.3 Consumption pathways effect
In the short term (between 2010 and 2040), assumptions behind low consumption
pathways (G2 Glob LowCons and G4 Frag LowEner scenarios) favor a lower oil de-
mand that results in lower oil prices as shown in Fig. 4.3 and lower energy intensity
of GDP (Fig. 4.4) compared to scenarios with business as usual development path-
ways (G1 Glob HighCons and G3 Frag HighCons). This is the direct consequence of
lower energy consumption in the residential sector, earlier saturation of consumers’
preferences for final goods and lower consumption of freight transport per unit of
good produced (as described in chapter 2). During the Peak Oil period, lower con-
sumption assumptions alleviate the impact of a lower technical change caused by
less capital availability which result in higher energy intensity in Fragmented glob-
alization scenarios.
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Figure 4.2: World oil production (Million b/d)
We now study the consequences of the sustainability challenge posed by oil avail-
ability on the stability of socioeconomic trajectories, as measured by the GDP trends.
Differences in GDP among the four scenarios are relatively tenuous except in
the G2 (Glob LowCons) scenario. However, when looking at different time periods,
we observe more contrasted results. In the short and medium term (up to 2060),
fragmented capital and good markets hurt the economy more significantly (scenar-
ios G3 Frag HigCons and G4 Frag LowCons) than in globalized scenarios, whatever
the assumptions regarding development styles. This is the result of the constraints
these assumptions impose on both capital availability for investment in new tech-
nologies and trade effects. Capital availability affects the resilience of the economy
to rising oil prices, especially in oil importing economies such as Europe. A higher
energy intensity of economic activity in a context of higher energy prices impacts
households’ purchase power and firms’ production costs.The assumption on the re-
gionalization of good markets has also crucial effects in driving the reaction of the
European economy to the Peak Oil. In a context of high energy prices, the value of
European energy imports significantly increases, resulting in a parallel increase of
industrial exports to restore the equilibrium of the balance of payments. In a context
of regionalized trade, which assumes preference for local goods, this can only occur
through significant gains of competitiveness as measured by a decrease of the terms
of trade and large real wage adjustments. Thus, these adjustments cause economic
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Figure 4.3: World oil price (normalized with benchmark G1)
losses as captured by 2030.
By contrast, at a longer horizon, the overall effect of the fragmentation is positive.
The economy relies less on international trade, as local production mostly meets
demand. This indeed entails lower oil demand and prices, which drives down energy
dependency and production costs, and enhances household’s purchase power. This
trend is strengthened in the case of low fossil energy consumption pathways (G4
Frag LowCons). Low energy consumption styles favor lower oil demand over the
entire period and thus limit the impact of the Peak Oil, especially in a fragmented
context (Table 4.1) .
To conclude, assumptions on the nature of the globalization of capital and goods
markets and behaviors impact the resilience of the economy faced with the oil con-
straint. In particular, globalization impacts the pace of technical change and the
dependence of the economy on international transport (in the long term), while the
nature of development behaviors alleviate or strengthen the impact of the globaliza-
tion assumptions.
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Figure 4.4: World energy intensity of GDP (normalized with benchmark G1)
4.1.2 The transition toward a low carbon society
4.1.2.1 Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Policies (World and Europe)
The carbon price trajectory in Figure 4.6 displays three distinct phases. Between
2010 and 2030, the carbon price increases to reach 120$ per t/CO2 around 2030,
with hardly any effect on oil prices that remain controlled by Middle East produc-
ers. This carbon price level is necessary to tap most of mitigation potentials in
the power, residential and industrial sectors, which represent the core of emissions
reductions at that time (IPCC, 2007). Between 2030 and 2050, the carbon price
decreases without hampering emissions reductions. Indeed, two mechanisms sustain
the decarbonlization process: (i) the cost of low-carbon options decreases through
learning by doing, and (ii) the oil price rise due to the Peak Oil although moderated
further stimulates technical change in low carbon options, through the wider de-
ployment of these technologies. After 2060, the increase in cabon prices is driven by
the high cost of mitigation potentials in the transportation sector, which is weakly
sensitive to energy prices.
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Figure 4.5: Final energy of transport in Europe (no climate policy)
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Figure 4.6: Carbon price in the G1 (Glob HighEner) scenario
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Figure 4.7: Coal, oil and world gas production (Mtoe)
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A climate policy significantly lowers the supply of oil, coal and gas (Figure 4.7).
More precisely, until 2030, the carbon price fosters lower oil and coal production,
while gas demand increases as a substitute for oil and coal, due to lower carbon
intensity of gas. Between 2030 and 2040, there is a return of coal (as a result of a
decrease of the carbon price). After 2050, coal reaches a plateau (idem for gas).
4.1.2.2 Macroeconomic effects on Climate Policies on Europe
In Europe, on average, climate policies decrease the average growth rate from 1.37%
to 1.28% for the benchmark scenario G1 (Glob HighCons) which is relatively mod-
erate (0.01% losses on average per year) (Table 4.2). Climate policies have however
different macroeconomic effects depending on the time marker considered. In the
short term (2010-2030), they slow down economic growth (from 2.03% to 1.76% per
year). This is the result of the introduction of the carbon price, which impacts a
carbon intensive European economy. In the medium term (between 2030 and 2050),
climate policies trigger much faster economic growth (from 1.76% to 1.84% per year).
This is a co-benefit of low carbon measures that foster a decreased oil dependency
and lowers the effects of Peak Oil. This underlines the role of climate policies in
preparing a sustainable future by hedging against the uncertainty on future oil sup-
ply (Rozenberg et al., 2010). The picture changes in the long term, i.e. after 2050.
Indeed, climate policies may then cause significant economic losses, due to the need
to abate transport-related emissions, which requires a fast increase in carbon prices
given the weak effect of price signals on this sector.
4.1.2.3 Impact of globalization and development styles
In the short to medium term, in Europe, GDP trends remain superior in a context of
globalization, whatever the assumptions on consumption pathways (G1 Glob HighCons Clim
and G2 Glob LowCons Clim). Fragmented capital markets essentially undermine
growth until 2030 as shown in Table 4.2. Indeed, this period requires fast technical
change to start the decarbonization of the economy, which is hindered by the re-
strictions on the availability of capital. By contrast, in the long term (after 2080),
GDP is higher in fragmented scenarios (G3 + Clim Frag HighCons Clim and G4 +
Clim Frag LowCons Clim) compared to globalized scenarios, as a result of a lower
dependency to international transport.
Assumptions on consumption pathways tend to alleviate the impact of lower
capital availability in the short term and after 2050. On the contrary, during the
Peak Oil (between 2030 and 2050) scenario G4 + Clim (Frag LowCons Clim) shows
a lower GDP growth rate compared to other scenarios. Indeed, low consumptions
pathways limit the European industrial exports in order to offset the increase in Eu-
ropean energy imports and thus restore the equilibrium of the balance of payments.
A first conclusion from these results is that a carbon price may induce the risk
of large economic downturns when the environmental constraints (depletion of fos-
sil fuel resources and carbon constraint) force drastic but unanticipated economic
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changes. For Europe, the cost of climate policies are also particularly dependent
on the assumptions on globalization. Regarding capital flows, fragmented markets
limit the access to capital and delay technical change. This affects the resilience
of the economy to rising oil prices, especially in oil-importing economies such as
Europe. This effect is persistent in the long term because of the cumulative effectss
on technical change. This is partially counterbalanced by the reduction of trade
volumes which has the advantage of reducing transport-related energy and carbon
uses. Secondly, low energy pathways (as represented in the model) are insufficient
to comply with the 2.5°C target and avoid transition costs in the short and long
term, even in a globalized context.
4.2 One-directional soft linking
When NLU is forced by exogenous trajectories of bionergy demand (biofuel + woody
biomass for electricity) and energy price from IMACLIM-R, the biophysical limits
represented in the model (potential crop yield and land availability) are rapidly
reached. In 2035, the model is not able to find a solution anymore.
As shown on Fig. 4.2, the demand for bioenergy coming from IMACLIM-R
amounts to ∼50% of the total human demand for vegetal products in 2035, which
has itself quite sharply risen since 2005. The bionergy demand is mainly composed
of biofuel (¿95% in all scenario). This context of rapid growth in biomass demand
triggers sizeable changes in the agricultural system. Between 2005 and 2035, the
cropland area at the world scale expands by ∼+50% in all scenarios, reaching ∼2400
Mha in 2038. At the same time, the yield gap, defined as the gap between the po-
tential yield and the actual yield divided by the gap between the potential yield and
the minimum yield, falls from 55% to 44% in the high food demand scenario and
from 57% to 52% in the low food demand scenario.
In 2035, the bioenergy demand begins to rise sharply to reach ∼16 Pkcal (∼60
exajoules) in all scenarios in 2100, i.e. ∼200% of the total human demand for vegetal
products. The rise in bioernegy demand is particularly strong in three regions : Latin
America, USA, and Europe. In this scenario, Europe becomes the third biggest
biofuel consumer in 2100, behind Latin America and USA.
Given the biophysical potential which is still available at this date, this rise in
demand for biomass products requires an increase in crop yields and/or cropland
which cannot be met by the NLU model, explaining why the model cannot find a
solution beyond this date.
Biofuels in IMACLIM-R are represented using cost curves from (IEA, 2006).
The penetration of biofuels on the liquid fuels market is based on these cost curves
depending on their competitiveness and availability. Both aspects are calculated by
equalling out the marginal production costs of each type of agrofuel and the price
of fossil fuel, with an eventual increase due to a carbon tax in the case of climate
policies.
These cost curves reflect the biofuel production potentials taking into account
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Figure 4.8: Bioenergy demand from IMACLIM-R versus food demand to 2100
technological change and the maturation of so-called second-generation technologies:
the cellulosic-lignite branch for ethanol and the biomass liquefaction branch for
biodiesel. The land constraint is also taken into account but in a quite rough manner.
In the NLU model, the land constraint is represent in much more detailed manner,
with explicit links to actual biophysical data. In addition, the estimation of the
land availability is consistent with the underlying scenarios in terms of demographic
growth, per capita food consumption and deforestation.
The representation of the technological change is also different in NLU, as this
model only considers technical options that are currently available. For this reason,
2nd generation bioful is not included in the study. Also, NLU does not consider any
increase in potential yield due to modern varieties or improved agricultural practices.
Thus, our results show that a detailed modelling of the land constraint is crucial
for estimating the actual biofuel production. Also, the influence of technological
change in the biofuel production sector appears to be determinant. In the NLU
analytical framework, we see that the target of a 16 Petakcal (∼60 exajoules) bioen-
ergy production in 2100 is not feasible given our scenarios on food consumption and
forest areas.
Another data exchange between IMACLIM-R and NLU concerns the oil and gas
price that are used to calculate the fertilizer price. The resulting index of nutrient
price is displayed on Fig. 4.2. In the climate scenarios, the fertiliser price are slightly
lower than in the Baseline scenarios at the beginning of the simulation period, and
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slightly higher at the end of it, mimicing the underlying evolution of the oil and gas
prices. There is however little contrast among the different scenarios because of the
relatively low value of the carbon price in the mitigation scenario (see section 4.1). As
a consequence, the influence of fertiliser price on farmer’s intensification is relatively
homogenous among the different scenarios studied.
Figure 4.9: Fertiliser price index to 2100 in the 6 scenarios studied (base 100=2001).
4.3 A world without biofuel: Results from the IMACLIM-
R model
The one-directional soft linking between IMACLIM-R and NLU cast doubts upon
the feasibility of large scale biofuel production. Another source of concerns about
biofuel production relates to the emissions from indirect land-use changes (Searchinger
et al., 2008, ILUC). Assuming that food demand is weakly elastic to price, any in-
crease in the production of biomass fuel generates a rise of crop prices and creates
an incentive to extend cultivated areas. From there, the ILUC concept refers to
the displacement of crops (food and non-food) or pastures on uncultivated land,
such as fallow or forest, resulting from the use of feedstock for agrofuels produc-
tion, and generating emissions of organic carbon stored in the vegetation and the
soils. Using the economic model FAPRI, and the life-cycle analysis model GREET,
(Searchinger et al., 2008) estimated the ILUC emissions for an ethanol scenario in
33
the USA. Their results showed that, once ILUC emissions are taken into account,
biofuel emits ∼50% more than the fossil fuel reference.
Following the study by (Searchinger et al., 2008), several evaluations have been
made to confirm this diagnosis. Most of these studies converged towards a value
of the ILUC emissions that puts into question the benefit of biofuel for mitigating
climate change (De Cara et al., 2012).
Given these conclusions, we consider an extreme case wherein there is no devel-
opment of biofuels, in particular for the G2 senario (Glob LowCons) which showed
the strongest resilience among the others scenarios in the previous section. We
then assess the impact on two indicators: energy intensity and GDP. In both sce-
narios, energy intensity is lower when there is no biofuel after 2040 (at the time
of the PO period). This is indeed the result in the baseline scenario of the ab-
sence of other substitute than biofuel to oil all the more as oil prices are insufficient
to foster the penetration CTL at that time. The economy is then constrained to
use less energy. When a climate policy is applied, the moderation of the energy
demand starts before 2040. In terms of macroeconomic impacts, less available en-
ergy in the baseline without biofuels limits economic development and implies lower
GDP growth. Lower GDP growth observed when a climate policy (compared to the
scenario Glob LowCons Clim) is applied are also the result of the inertias of the
transport sector after 2050.
Table 4.1: Europe mean GDP growth - baseline
2010-2100 2010-2040 2040-2080 2080-2100
G1 (Glob HighCons) 1.37% 2.08% 0.98% 1.1%
G2 (Glob LowCons) 1.43% 2.23% 0.96% 1.19%
G3 (Frag HighCons) 1.36% 1.95% 0.9% 1.39%
G4 (Frag LowCons) 1.39% 2.07% 0.86% 1.42%
Table 4.2: Europe mean GDP growth - climat
2010-2100 2010-2040 2040-2080 2080-2100
G1 (Glob HighCons Clim) 1.37% 2.08% 0.98% 1.1%
G2 (Glob LowCons Clim) 1.43% 2.23% 0.96% 1.19%
G3 (Frag HighCons Clim) 1.36% 1.95% 0.9% 1.39%
G4 (Frag LowCons Clim) 1.39% 2.07% 0.86% 1.42%
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This report is based on the view that the interplay between globalisation and sus-
tainability should be studied within a comprehensive analytical framework that in-
corporates two pivotal dimensions: market flexibility (for goods and capital) and
changes in lifestyles and consumption pathways. Many social scientists consider the
intensification of exchanges between countries as a strong driver for the standard-
ization of people’s tastes and preferences through the spreading of Western lifestyles
(Sklair, 2002; Stephan et al., 2011). Thus, economic assessments of the impact of
trade and capital openness on sustainable development require a consistent analysis
of the changes in lifestyles and the subsequent evolution of consumption patterns.
To carry out this study, we developed an analytical framework that takes into
account the market flexibility and different consumption patterns, using four sce-
narios as inputs to the general equilibrium model IMACLIM-R and the land-use
model NLU. Our results show that the transition to a low carbon economy is sig-
nificantly affected by the globalization of capital and goods markets. Indeed, lower
capital availability hinders technical change and the penetration of low energy and
carbon technologies. On the contrary, a lower intensity of trade in a context of frag-
mented globalization, by reducing the intensity of international freigth transport,
limits the impacts of rising oil prices after the peak oil. Alternative consumption
pathways can alleviate or worsen these impacts. Indeed, the globalization of capital
and goods markets mainly determines the pace and the direction of the transition
towards a low carbon economy. Consumption pathways influence the intensity of
changes. For instance, assumptions on consumption pathways tend to alleviate the
impact of lower capital availability. At a sectoral level, our findings reveal specifically
the decisive role of transport dynamics. Indeed, the inertia of transport infrastruc-
tures and logistic chains limits the transformation of this sector. Green logistics and
sustainable supply-chain management, in part driven by the IT revolution, provide
possible answers to this issue, as shown by (Ko¨hler, 2014) in the case of international
shipping and long-haul aviation. Our scenarios also show that biofuels, as substi-
tutes to oil in this sector, could have a significant impact on land-use dynamics.
Linking the IMACLIM-R and NLU models reveals that the amount of biofuels re-
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quired in all scenarios cannot be met because of land constraints. Indeed, restricted
land availability and competition with food production, as well as the emissions
related to indirect land-use changes, may hinder their development. Second genera-
tion biofuels (from residues or crops growing on marginal land) may be an option to
overcome these issues, but would require sustained eco-innovation efforts to become
economically competitive with fossil fuels (see (Ko¨hler et al., 2014) in particular
for a detailed analysis of the economic and regulatory conditions for key developing
countries).
From a research perspective, these findings show the importance of a detailed
modeling of the land-use sector in integrated assessments of the globalization vs
sustainability issue1. They also imply to pay a closer attention to the design of
policies and their financing to support the transition towards a low oil and carbon
society. In addition to the better integration of land use issues, these would be two
major ways of improving our study. These are also main challenges on the scientific
agenda of the wider Integrated Assessment Modeling community. First, by focusing
only on the freight sector, our scenarios do not consider alternative assumptions
on personal mobility, which is supposed to increase in the coming decades. The
high costs entailed by the inertias of the transport sector could also be avoided by
deploying infrastructures favoring sustainable cities, and low-transport production
systems. Such infrastructure policies should be implemented early on (Waisman
et al., 2013), which raises the crucial issue of their financing in the currently adverse
context of high public debt. The IMACLIM model could yet be improved by ex-
plicitly representing all determinants of capital allocation to analyze the conditions
of an allocation of investments in accordance with sustainability objectives. (Hour-
cade and Shukla, 2013), building on (Hourcade et al., 2012), show the crucial role
of organizing low-carbon finance that would be able to redirect capital funds to-
wards low-carbon infrastructures. The redirection of investments still needs specific
devices. For example, a social cost of carbon as part of a climate-friendly archi-
tecture (possibly in a Post Kyoto framework) may enhance investors’ confidence in
low-carbon projects and reduce the attractiveness of speculative investments.
From a perspective of sustainable development governance, this study has iden-
tified possible tensions that relate to the combining process of globalization, con-
sumption pathways and climate issues. These issues are to varying degrees on the
agenda of multiple arenas of negotiations, such as the UNFCCC, the WTO (World
Trade Organization) or the UN process of defining Sustainable Development Goals.
Some see substantial progress of the internationalization of global challenges, others
consider that the complex international architecture is unlikely to promote efficient
issue-linkage among policies. This debate is beyond the scope of this report. We
can simply conclude that one challenging issue for Europe is to try to make these
agendas consistent by building a multi-level strategy in line with its own objectives:
being a leader in the race of the upcoming so-called ”green industrial revolution”
1For a model comparison of the importance of bioenergy supply modeling regarding long-run
climate objectives, see (Rose et al., 2013).
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in the fierce context of global competition, while allowing for inclusive development
among all Member States. Given the internal political and social difficulties of the
EU, this is without a doubt a daunting and exciting challenge of the coming years
and decades.
37
Bibliography
Ahmad, S. (1966). On the theory of induced innovation. Economic Journal, 76:344–
357.
Alexandratos, N. and Bruinsma, J. (2012). World agriculture towards 2030/2050.
the 2012 revision. Technical report, FAO. ESA Working paper No. 12-03.
Balat, M. and Balat, H. (2009). Recent trends in global production and utilization
of bio-ethanol fuel. Applied Energy, 86(11):2273–2282.
Barker, T., Bashmakov, I., Bernstein, L., Bogner, J., Bosch, P., Dave, R., David-
son, O., Fisher, B., Halsnæs, K., Heij, G., Ribeiro, S., Kobayashi, S., Levine, M.,
Martino, D., Masera, O., Metz, B., Meyer, L., Nabuurs, G.-J., Najam, A., Naki-
cenovic, N., Rogner, H.-H., Roy, J., Sathaye, J., Schock, R., Shukla, P., Sims, R.,
Smith, P., Tirpak, D., Urge-Vorsatz, D., and Zhou, D. (2007). Technical summary.
Cambridge University Press.
Bibas, R. and Me´jean, A. (2013). Potential and limitations of bioenergy for low
carbon transitions. Climatic Change, pages 1–31.
Bibas, R., Me´jean, A., and Hamdi-Cherif, M. (2014). Energy efficiency policies and
the timing of action: An assessment of climate mitigation costs. Technological
Forecasting & Social Change, (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2014.05.003).
Bouwman, A., der Hoek, K. V., Eickhout, B., and Soenario, I. (2005). Exploring
changes in world ruminant production systems. Agricultural Systems, 84(2):121–
153.
Brasil, Ministe´rio da Agricultura, Pecua´ria e Abastecimento (2013). Statistical Year-
book of Agrienergy 2012. Bras´ılia.
Brunelle, T., Dumas, P., and Souty, F. (2014a). The impact of globalization on food
and agriculture: The case of the diet convergence. The Journal of Environment
& Development, 23(1):41–65.
Brunelle, T., Dumas, P., Souty, F., F., N., and Dorin, B. (2014b). Evaluating
the impact of rising fertilizer prices on crop yields. Submitted to Agricultural
Economics.
38
De Cara, S., Gabrielle, B., Goussebaille, A., Grateau, R., Levert, F., and Quemener,
J. (2012). Revue critique des e´tudes e´valuant l’effet des changements d’affectation
des sols sur les bilans environnementaux des biocarburants. Technical report.
96 pp.
Dorin, B. (2011). Agribiom caloric balance sheets. In Paillard et al. (2011b), pages
25–65. Updated estimates from “Agribiom: a tool for scenario-building and hybrid
modelling”.
Edenhofer, O., Knopf, B., Barker, T., Baumstark, L., Bellevrat, E., Chateau, B.,
Criqui, P., Isaac, M., Kitous, A., Kypreos, S., Leimbach, M., and Bertra, K. L.
(2010). The economics of low stabilization: Model comparison of mitigation strate-
gies and costs. The Energy Journal, 31(special issue):1–48.
Guivarch, C., Crassous, R., Sassi, O., and Hallegatte, S. (2011). The costs of climate
policies in a second-best world with labour market imperfections. Climate Policy,
11(1):768–788.
Hourcade, J., Perrissin Fabert, B., and Rozenberg, J. (2012). Venturing into un-
charted financial waters: an essay on climate-friendly finance. International En-
vironmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 12(2):165–186.
Hourcade, J.-C. and Shukla, P. (2013). Triggering the low-carbon transition in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis. Climate Policy, 13(sup01):22–35.
Hourcade, J. C., Shukla, P. R., and Mathy, S. (2008). Untying the climate – devel-
opment gordian knot: Economic options in a politically constrained world.
IEA (2006). World Energy Outlook 2006. Technical report, International Energy
Agency.
IEA (2012). World energy outlook 2013.
IPCC (2000). Special Report on Emissions Scenarios. Cambridge University Press.
IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Cambridge University Press. Con-
tribution of the Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007 The Physical Science Basis. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. Contribution
of the Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change.
IPCC (2013). Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Technical report.
IPCC (2014). Technical summary group iii mitigation of climate change. Technical
report.
39
Ko¨hler, J. (2014). Globalization and sustainable development: Case study on in-
ternational transport and sustainable development. Journal of Environment and
Development, 23(1):66–100.
Ko¨hler, J., Walz, R., and Marscheider-Weidemann, F. (2014). Eco-innovation in
nics: Conditions for export success with an application to biofuels in transport.
The Journal of Environment & Development, 23(1):133–159.
McKibbin, W., Ross, M., Shackleton, R., and Wilcoxen, P. (1999). Emissions trad-
ing, capital flows and the kyoto protocol (the costs of the kyoto protocol: A
multi-model evaluation). The Energy Journal, page 287–334.
Mitchell, R. B. (2012). Technology is not enough: Climate change, population, aﬄu-
ence, and consumption. The Journal of Environment & Development, 21(1):24–27.
OECD and FAO (2008). OECD-FAO agricultural outlook 2008-2017. Technical
report, OECD and FAO.
Paillard, S., Dorin, B., Le Cotty, T., Ronzon, T., and Treyer, S. (2011a). Food secu-
rity by 2050: Insights from the agrimonde project. European Foresight Platform
Brief no. 196, CIRAD, INRA.
Paillard, S., Treyer, S., and Dorin, B. (2011b). Agrimonde, Scenarios and Challenges
for Feeding the World in 2050. Quae, Versailles.
Peters, G. P., Marland, G., Le Que´re´, C., Boden, T., Canadell, J. G., and Raupach,
M. R. (2011). Rapid growth in co2 emissions after the 2008–2009 global financial
crisis. Nature Climate Change, 2(1):2–4.
Ramankutty, N., Evan, A. T., Monfreda, C., and Foley, J. A. (2008). Farming the
planet: 1. geographic distribution of global agricultural lands in the year 2000.
Global Biogeochemical Cycles, 22.
Ramankutty, N. and Foley, J. A. (1999). Estimating historical changes in global land
cover: croplands from 1700 to 1992. Global Biogeochemical Cycles, 13(4):997–1027.
Raupach, M. R., Marland, G., Ciais, P., Le Que´re´, C., Canadell, J. G., Klepper, G.,
and Field, C. B. (2007). Global and regional drivers of accelerating co2 emissions.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(24):10288–10293.
Robert K. Kaufmann, Stephane Dees, P. K. and Sanchez, M. (2004). Does OPEC
Matter? An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices. The Energy Journal, 0(Number
4):67–90.
Rose, S. K., Kriegler, E., Bibas, R., Calvin, K., Popp, A., van Vuuren, D. P., and
Weyant, J. (2013). Bioenergy in energy transformation and climate management.
Climatic Change, pages 1–17.
40
Rozenberg, J., Hallegatte, S., Vogt-Schilb, A., Sassi, O., Guivarch, C., Waisman, H.,
and Hourcade, J.-C. (2010). Climate policies as a hedge against the uncertainty
on future oil supply. Climatic Change, 101(3-4):663–668.
Sands, R. D., Miller, S., and Kim, M. K. (2005). The second generation model:
Comparison of SGM and GTAP approaches to data development. PNNL report.
Searchinger, T., Heimlich, R., Houghton, R. A., Dong, F., Elobeid, A., Fabiosa, J.,
Tokgoz, S., Hayes, D., and Yu, T.-H. (2008). Use of U.S. croplands for biofu-
els increases greenhouse gases through emissions from land-use change. Science,
319(5867):1238–1240.
Sklair, L. (2002). Globalization: capitalism and its alternatives. Oxford University
Press.
Smeets, E. M., Faaij, A. P., Lewandowski, I. M., and Turkenburg, W. C. (2007). A
bottom-up assessment and review of global bio-energy potentials to 2050. Progress
in Energy and Combustion Science, 33(1):56–106.
Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 70(1):65–94.
Souty, F., Brunelle, T., Dumas, P., Dorin, B., Ciais, P., Crassous, R., Mu¨ller, C.,
and Bondeau, A. (2012). The nexus land-use model version 1.0, an approach
articulating biophysical potentials and economic dynamics to model competition
for land-use. Geoscientific Model Development, 5(5):1297–1322.
Stephan, H., Weaver, P., Bartelson, J., and Faran, T. (2011). Final report on
globalisation and sustainable development informed by sustainability. Technical
report, Globis research consortium.
United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Our
common future (brundtland report). Technical report.
Waisman, H., Guivarch, C., Grazi, F., and Hourcade, J. (2012a). The imaclim-
r model: infrastructures, technical inertia and the costs of low carbon futures
under imperfect foresight. Climatic Change, 114(1):101–120.
Waisman, H., Rozenberg, J., Sassi, O., and Hourcade, J.-C. (2012b). Peak oil profiles
through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment. Energy Policy, 48(0):744 –
753. Special Section: Frontiers of Sustainability.
Waisman, H.-D., Cassen, C., Hamdi-Che´rif, M., and Hourcade, J.-C. (2014). Sus-
tainability, globalization, and the energy sector europe in a global perspective.
The Journal of Environment & Development, 23(1):101–132.
Waisman, H.-D., Guivarch, C., and Lecocq, F. (2013). The transportation sector
and low-carbon growth pathways: modelling urban, infrastructure, and spatial
determinants of mobility. Climate Policy, 13(sup01):106–129.
41
Weyant, Davidson, Dowlatabadi, Edmonds, Grubb, Parson, and Fankhauser (1996).
Integrated assessment of climate change: An overview and comparison of ap-
proaches and results. In J. P. Bruce, H. Lee & E. F. Haites (Eds.), Climate
change 1995: Economic and social dimensions of climate change (pp. 374–380).
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
42
